Wednesday, December 19, 2012

Mankiw on Keynes



"It is hard to say how successful monetary and fiscal policy will be in avoiding a deep downturn. But as events unfold, you can be sure that policymakers in the Fed and Treasury will be looking at them through a Keynesian lens.
In 1936, Keynes wrote, “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slave of some defunct economist.” In 2008, no defunct economist is more prominent than Keynes himself."

Monday, December 17, 2012

Power, Guns, Extreme Individualism: Foucault

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/the-freedom-of-an-armed-society/?hp
DECEMBER 16, 2012, 1:00 PM

The Freedom of an Armed Society

In the wake of the school massacre in Newtown, Conn., and the resulting renewed debate on gun control in the United States, The Stone will publish a series of essays this week that examine the ethical, social and humanitarian implications on the use, possession and regulation of weapons.
~~~
The night of the shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn., I was in the car with my wife and children, working out details for our eldest son's 12th birthday the following Sunday - convening a group of friends at a showing of the film  "The Hobbit." The memory of the Aurora movie theatre massacre was fresh in his mind, so he was concerned that it not be a late night showing. At that moment, like so many families, my wife and I were weighing whether to turn on the radio and expose our children to coverage of the school shootings in Connecticut. We did. The car was silent in the face of the flood of gory details. When the story was over, there was a long thoughtful pause in the back of the car. Then my eldest son asked if he could be homeschooled.
That incident brought home to me what I have always suspected, but found difficult to articulate: an armed society - especially as we prosecute it at the moment in this country - is the opposite of a civil society.
The Newtown shootings occurred at a peculiar time in gun rights history in this nation. On one hand, since the mid 1970s, fewer households each year on average have had a gun. Gun control advocates should be cheered by that news, but it is eclipsed by a flurry of contrary developments. As has been well publicized, gun sales have steadily risen over the past few years, and spiked with each of Obama's election victories.
Furthermore, of the weapons that proliferate amongst the armed public, an increasing number are high caliber weapons (the weapon of choice in the goriest shootings in recent years). Then there is the legal landscape, which looks bleak for the gun control crowd.
Every state except for Illinois has a law allowing the carrying of concealed weapons - and just last week, a federal court struck down Illinois' ban. States are now lining up to allow guns on college campuses. In September, Colorado joined four other states in such a move, and statehouses across the country are preparing similar legislation. And of course, there was Oklahoma's ominous Open Carry Law approved by voters this election day - the fifteenth of its kind, in fact - which, as the name suggests, allows those with a special permit to carry weapons in the open, with a holster on their hip.
Individual gun ownership - and gun violence - has long been a distinctive feature of American society, setting us apart from the other industrialized democracies of the world. Recent legislative developments, however, are progressively bringing guns out of the private domain, with the ultimate aim of enshrining them in public life. Indeed, the N.R.A. strives for a day when the open carry of powerful weapons might be normal, a fixture even, of any visit to the coffee shop or grocery store - or classroom.
As N.R.A. president Wayne LaPierre expressed in a recent statement on the organization's Web site, more guns equal more safety, by their account. A favorite gun rights saying is "an armed society is a polite society." If we allow ever more people to be armed, at any time, in any place, this will provide a powerful deterrent to potential criminals. Or if more citizens were armed - like principals and teachers in the classroom, for example - they could halt senseless shootings ahead of time, or at least early on, and save society a lot of heartache and bloodshed.
As ever more people are armed in public, however - even brandishing weapons on the street - this is no longer recognizable as a civil society. Freedom is vanished at that point.
And yet, gun rights advocates famously maintain that individual gun ownership, even of high caliber weapons, is the defining mark of our freedom as such, and the ultimate guarantee of our enduring liberty. Deeper reflection on their argument exposes basic fallacies.
In her book "The Human Condition," the philosopher Hannah Arendt states that "violence is mute." According to Arendt, speech dominates and distinguishes the polis, the highest form of human association, which is devoted to the freedom and equality of its component members. Violence - and the threat of it - is a pre-political manner of communication and control, characteristic of undemocratic organizations and hierarchical relationships. For the ancient Athenians who practiced an incipient, albeit limited form of democracy (one that we surely aim to surpass), violence was characteristic of the master-slave relationship, not that of free citizens.
Arendt offers two points that are salient to our thinking about guns: for one, they insert a hierarchy of some kind, but fundamental nonetheless, and thereby undermine equality. But furthermore, guns pose a monumental challenge to freedom, and particular, the liberty that is the hallmark of any democracy worthy of the name - that is, freedom of speech. Guns do communicate, after all, but in a way that is contrary to free speech aspirations: for, guns chasten speech.
This becomes clear if only you pry a little more deeply into the N.R.A.'s logic behind an armed society. An armed society is polite, by their thinking, precisely because guns would compel everyone to tamp down eccentric behavior, and refrain from actions that might seem threatening. The suggestion is that guns liberally interspersed throughout society would cause us all to walk gingerly - not make any sudden, unexpected moves - and watch what we say, how we act, whom we might offend.
As our Constitution provides, however, liberty entails precisely the freedom to be reckless, within limits, also the freedom to insult and offend as the case may be. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld our right to experiment in offensive language and ideas, and in some cases, offensive action and speech. Such experimentation is inherent to our freedom as such. But guns by their nature do not mix with this experiment - they don't mix with taking offense. They are combustible ingredients in assembly and speech.
I often think of the armed protestor who showed up to one of the famously raucous town hall hearings on Obamacare in the summer of 2009. The media was very worked up over this man, who bore a sign that invoked a famous quote of Thomas Jefferson, accusing the president of tyranny. But no one engaged him at the protest; no one dared approach him even, for discussion or debate - though this was a town hall meeting, intended for just such purposes. Such is the effect of guns on speech - and assembly. Like it or not, they transform the bearer, and end the conversation in some fundamental way. They announce that the conversation is not completely unbounded, unfettered and free; there is or can be a limit to negotiation and debate - definitively.
The very power and possibility of free speech and assembly rests on their non-violence. The power of the Occupy Wall Street movement, as well as the Arab Spring protests, stemmed precisely from their non-violent nature. This power was made evident by the ferocity of government response to the Occupy movement. Occupy protestors across the country were increasingly confronted by police in military style garb and affect.
Imagine what this would have looked like had the protestors been armed: in the face of the New York Police Department assault on Zuccotti Park, there might have been armed insurrection in the streets. The non-violent nature of protest in this country ensures that it can occur.
Gun rights advocates also argue that guns provide the ultimate insurance of our freedom, in so far as they are the final deterrent against encroaching centralized government, and an executive branch run amok with power. Any suggestion of limiting guns rights is greeted by ominous warnings that this is a move of expansive, would-be despotic government. It has been the means by which gun rights advocates withstand even the most seemingly rational gun control measures. An assault weapons ban, smaller ammunition clips for guns, longer background checks on gun purchases - these are all measures centralized government wants, they claim, in order to exert control over us, and ultimately impose its arbitrary will. I have often suspected, however, that contrary to holding centralized authority in check, broad individual gun ownership gives the powers-that-be exactly what they want.
After all, a population of privately armed citizens is one that is increasingly fragmented, and vulnerable as a result. Private gun ownership invites retreat into extreme individualism - I heard numerous calls for homeschooling in the wake of the Newtown shootings - and nourishes the illusion that I can be my own police, or military, as the case may be. The N.R.A. would have each of us steeled for impending government aggression, but it goes without saying that individually armed citizens are no match for government force. The N.R.A. argues against that interpretation of the Second Amendment that privileges armed militias over individuals, and yet it seems clear that armed militias, at least in theory, would provide a superior check on autocratic government.
As Michel Foucault pointed out in his detailed study of the mechanisms of power, nothing suits power so well as extreme individualism. In fact, he explains, political and corporate interests aim at nothing less than "individualization," since it is far easier to manipulate a collection of discrete and increasingly independent individuals than a community. Guns undermine just that - community. Their pervasive, open presence would sow apprehension, suspicion, mistrust and fear, all emotions that are corrosive of community and civic cooperation. To that extent, then, guns give license to autocratic government.
Our gun culture promotes a fatal slide into extreme individualism. It fosters a society of atomistic individuals, isolated before power - and one another - and in the aftermath of shootings such as at Newtown, paralyzed with fear. That is not freedom, but quite its opposite. And as the Occupy movement makes clear, also the demonstrators that precipitated regime change in Egypt and Myanmar last year, assembled masses don't require guns to exercise and secure their freedom, and wield world-changing political force. Arendt and Foucault reveal that power does not lie in armed individuals, but in assembly - and everything conducive to that.
Firmin DeBrabander is an associate professor of philosophy at the Maryland Institute College of Art, Baltimore and the author of "Spinoza and 
the Stoics."

Sunday, December 9, 2012

Kids, Sexuality, and Life

http://www.amazon.com/Talk-Me-First-Everything-Go/dp/0738215082

"One of the reasons they [our kids] sometimes think (and act) as if they know everything is that in their mind, they absolutely do. They may know absolutely everything they're capable of understanding at their age about a particular subject, but their limited brainpower can't support them imagining what else they might not know." p.11

It's not about "the talk" or the physiology of sex, that's the "easy part", it's about how to think about sex in a meaningful context that is the real challenge. 17

"...the very best sexuality education at home and in schools is not about prevention, but about creation.  Its purpose is to teach young people how to create for themselves enjoyable, caring, and responsible sexual lives." 19

What children need from their parents at all ages of development (and which separates adults from children): affirmation, information, clarity about values, limits and boundaries, guidance: 49


Friday, November 30, 2012

Plutocrats: The rise of the new Global Super Rich...


‘Romney is Wall Street’s worst bet since the bet on subprime’

By Ezra Klein , Updated:

Chrystia Freeland is editor of Thomson Reuters Digital and author of “The Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else.” We spoke Tuesday about how the plutocrats she reported on for the book were handling Mitt Romney’s loss. A lightly edited transcript of our conversation follows.
Ezra Klein: You’ve written about the revolt of the very rich against President Obama, and all the money they spent and time they dedicated to defeating him. So what’s the mood in those circles now that they’ve lost?
Chrystia Freeland: There’s a great joke on Wall Street which is that the bet on Romney is Wall Street’s worst bet since the bet on subprime. But I found the hostility towards Obama astonishing. I found the commitment to getting him out astonishing. I found the absolute confidence that it would work astonishing. On that Tuesday, the big Romney backers I was talking to were sure he was going to win. They were all flying into Logan Airport for the victory party. There’s this stunned feeling of how could we be so wrong, and a feeling of alienation.
The Romney comments to his donors, for which he was roundly pounced on by Republican politicians, I think they accurately reflected the view of a lot of these money guys. It’s the continuation of this 47 percent idea. They believe that Obama has been shoring up the entitlement society, and if you give enough entitlements to enough people, they’ll vote for you.
EK: Here’s my question about those comments. Romney was promising the very rich either a huge tax cut or, if you believe he would’ve paid for every dime and dollar of his cut, protection from any tax increases. He was promising financiers that he would roll back Dodd-Frank and Sarbanex-Oxley. He was promising current seniors that he wouldn’t touch their benefit. How are these not “gifts”?
CF: Let me be clear that I’m not defending any of them. But I think the way it works — and I think Romney’s comments were very telling in this regard — there are two differences in the mind of this class. First, they’re absolutely convinced that they’re not asking for special privileges for themselves. They’re convinced that it just so happens that their self-interest coincides perfectly with the collective interest. That’s where you get this idea of the “job creators”. The view is that to seek a low tax environment or less regulation, that’s not special pleading for yourself, it’s not transactional politics. It’s that this set of rules is the most conducive to economic growth for everybody. It will grow the pie. Now, it also happens to be an incredibly convenient way of thinking. If you’ve developed an ideology that what’s good for you personally also happens to be good for everyone else, that’s quite wonderful because there’s no moral tension.
EK: You and I spoke shortly before the election for a piece I was doing on Romney’s history as a manager. These folks, too, are purportedly very data focused, very good at assimilating new information. So I find it genuinely scary that neither Romney nor his super-rich backers had any idea he was going to lose. All the polls, all the models, all the betting markets said he was likely to lose. How did a group of people who, in their jobs, have to be willing to read and respond to disappointing data convince themselves to ignore every piece of data we had?
CF: That’s the single most astonishing thing. By his own definition, Romney’s single strongest qualification to become president was analytically based, managerial excellence. And if the election campaign were the test of that, and even if you were ideologically his fan, you should think it right that he lost. Now, how could it happen? My first thought was it was also the case that all the smartest guys in the room managed to lose a lot of money in 2008 and managed to convince themselves of a set of very mistaken beliefs about where the markets where going to go. It was a lot of the same people on the wrong side of both bets.
But I find it truly mystifying. I don’t claim to have particularly unique insight. I think it could be a combination of things. One is a generic belief that in order to run for president you have to think you’re going to win. You can’t do it otherwise. A second thing, and this is not so much about the rich guys as about the Republican Party in America, I think Republicans have felt since the time of Ronald Reagan that they are the party that represents the true America, and that the Democrats might sometimes win, but it’s kind of an aberration. And when it comes to the super-rich guy dimension, and I imagine this has happened to Obama as well, when you’re a rich and powerful guy, it can make it hard to see reality, especially when you’re paying your campaign staff great salaries, as Romney was.
EK: One explanation for the deteriorating relationship between Obama and this class of very, very rich folks is that it comes down to taxes. But in 2008, many of these same people supported Obama, and he said then, too, that he wanted to raise their taxes. Another explanation is that the dislike is personal: They feel that Obama doesn’t respect them, and so they hate him. Where do you come down?
CF: I think that it was both. I do think that Obama was particularly bad at dealing with these guys. Unnecessarily so. And I don’t really understand why. It’s of a piece with the general knock on him, which is that he’s too aloof. He was certainly aloof with his rich donors.
I’ve heard from people who worked in the White House that he doesn’t like rich people. I don’t actually think it’s true. I think he has a kind of Harvard Law School sense of kinship with these guys. He’s a member of the same technocratic elite. He could have taken that path. He has an admiration for those skills. But what he doesn’t have at all is a belief that the pure fact of having made a lot of money makes your views more valuable, or makes you more interesting or smarter than anyone else.
But remember, there are two different issues. One is, are you going to pay a higher tax bill? At the end of the day, rich people really don’t want to, and I think they’re finding they’re more averse to it than they actually thought they would be as it comes closer to reality. But second, iIthink what Obama has done is quite striking: he has said the economy isn’t working for everybody, and he has said it’s possible in this economy for economic acts to take place that are really good for a wealthy person and neutral or even bad for the middle class. The Bain Capital ads were such a lightning rod and so alienating even to some Democrats because they put that on the table. That is something no one has said in political power for 30 years. That is profoundly threatening for this group. It’s threatening politically, but it’s also emotionally and morally threatening.
I think the thing which has been so comfortable about being a member of the super-rich, especially in the United States, is that you have been able to feel that the act of becoming wealthy, absent everything else, was also an act of civic virtue. That’s so wonderful! You’re not just pursuing your own self-interest talking about lower taxes at the top but the collective self-interest.
EK: I’d add one dimension to that. From my reporting with the White House, I think the president’s view of the economy is that globalization is here and it’s not going away. The economy rewards high skills more than ever. Automatic and computerization and foreign competition are wiping out many middle class jobs, and while some new ones are created, it’s not at all clear that enough are being created. But in his view, he sees more redistribution as very necessary in this context. He thinks that if the economy is going to grow but the gains won’t be broadly shared, then it’s the government’s role to try and redistribute some, though of course not all, or even most, of those gains.
My experience is that the very rich are open to higher taxes in the context of a deficit deal. They like, or think they like, the Simpson-Bowles plan. They’re very friendly with Mayor Mike Bloomberg, who says he’d let all the Bush tax cuts expire. But they don’t like the idea that their money should be redistributed simply because they have too much of it. They don’t like the idea that, so to speak, they didn’t build all of this, and as such, they need to give back in order to make sure it continues. And so that’s part of the tension: They don’t like why Obama is raising their taxes. And they certainly don’t like the lack of admiration he’s showing while trying to do it. They see it as punishing their success.
CF: I completely agree. I think Obama and the economists around him have a very sophisticated understanding of both globalization and the technology revolution and the impact they’re having on the world economy and they way they’re creating these winner-take-all spirals. The positive scenario, which I think is a bit pollyannaish, is all you need to do is improve the education system and change the skill set and all will be well. And even that takes a lot of investment and a lot of time. But there’s actually the possibility that in order to have a healthy middle class, you’re going to need to have a more redistributive society, at least for awhile. I think that’s something the American super-rich don’t think about much. One guy who’s a liberal Democratic guy, who has worked in Washington for Democrats, who I quote in my book, he said to me, maybe this is how the world is. Maybe the 1950s were an aberration and the way the economy naturally works is this wide difference in distribution.
EK: As a general point, though, I imagine that’s somewhat scary to these guys. If the basic, positive-sum nature of economic policy is eroding, and we’re going to have fiercer political battles over who gets the spoils of growth, that’s got to be worrying. I imagine the very rich look out and think to themselves, there are more of them then there are of us. That seems to me to be the concern that’s beginning to break into the open with this talk of “gifts.”
CF: The happy way of reconciling that problem is to have an economy where the natural outcome of all of us working hard and being successful and all those good things leads to a more 1950s-style distribution. We’re more comfortable with that. Yes, the people with merit and inventiveness should be at the top, but we want the natural outcome to be harmonious. And the scary thing is, what if that’s just not how the economy will work for the next 20 or 30 years? What if even if we get education and economic policy and all the rest of it right, that we’re not there? Do you say, okay, the way it’s working now is not consistent with how we imagine this democracy should work and therefore we believe the rich should be taxed more aggressively to support the middle class? That’s a very different way of thinking about the economy and the social contract. And after Romney’s loss, the scary thing for the super-rich becomes actually maybe they’re not going to be the ones to decide.
EK: How much do these guys think about luck and privilege? You have this great quote in the book from Larry Summers, where he’s reflecting on the Harvard admissions process, and the question of whether you admit the kid who has learned Mandarin with his private tutor because, look, that kid learned Mandarin, or do you admit the kid who is alike in all other respects but whose parents could never have afforded a private Mandarin tutor?
CF: I think the issue of the kid is related to but separate of luck. There’s a question of do you buy the Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers theory of the world, or do you buy the manifest destiny, I-have-the-royal-jelly and you don’t view? There’s no one way of seeing the world, and different people are different, but for me, the most vivid statement of the royal jelly view came from Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who said if a man is not an oligarch, something is not right with him. The great thing about the Russians is they’ll say that kind of stuff directly. My suspicion is that’s a view quite a few of these people have.
We’re raised by our mothers not to brag too much, so that constrains the impulse to say that kind of thing, but I also think that especially for the guys who get to the billionaire level, they have a feeling, and perhaps it’s not an unjustified feeling, of having an extremely unique set of skills that sets them apart from everybody else, and it’s partly brainpower, but they all see it as crucially including an ability to judge and take risks and work very hard. They feel that that makes them stand out in an important way. I think also that a lot of them think that skills are transferable. That’s why a Bill Gates thinks the skillset it takes to found Microsoft is the skillset that can cure malaria.
Having said that, one thing I think is to what extent do you feel that the most important measure of value in society is accumulating a fortune. A lot of Americans think that’s really where it’s at. To get back to Romney, that’s where you get the belief that being successful in business qualifies you to be president. What’s interesting to me is that if you talk to the billionaires in other countries that have different social orders, you heard different views on this.
Yuri Millner, the Russian billionaire, set up a prize in theoretical physics where he gave three million bucks each to what he thought were the nine best theoretical physicists in the world. The reason he did that, he said, is that he thinks that the way our society allocates brainpower against work is not ideal. He thinks the work he does is kind of boring and humdrum and doesn’t make that much of a difference in the world but leads to these huge rewards, while in his view, the most defining and important work, the work that makes us human, is grappling with understanding the universe. George Soros will say that he thinks the most important human endeavor is to be a philosopher. You encounter that sentiment less often among the anglo saxons, because we’ve persuaded ourselves that the heroes of our social narrative our businesspeople.
EK: But the tension in that narrative, I think, is between the businesspeople and the do-gooders. As i read it, much of the fight between Obama and these financiers is the fight between the Ivy League kids who turned away from the money and went into do-goodery professions like community organizing and their roommates who went to Goldman Sachs and have always felt resentful of both the implied and explicit verdict that they sold out.
CF: I agree with that. I think what’s interesting is that division into the two tribes, the do-gooders and the moneymakers, leaves out the ideas pursuers. The only other thing I would say is that I think — and I don’t reject this view, I think there’s a lot of legitimacy to it — I think there is a view among many of these guys that says I am contributing more good to the world than 99.9 percent of NGO workers. I am a job creator.
You’ve probably talked to Ed Conard, the Bain Capital guy, and he expresses this very articulately: His argument is the highest and most important sphere of activity is the allocation of capital, that it’s hard to do, that the people who do it well need to be rewarded, and that that is actually what drives the improvements in society, more than a lot of this do-goody stuff. So it’s not solely a question of the business guys feeling they lose in the virtue stakes compared to their college roommates who became community organizers. I think some of them feel those people are just fooling around on the margins while they’re engaged in the real questions that save and shape the world.
Now, I think Obama very much saw the world in the way you describe it and made that choice not to make money and to instead try and make the world a better place. But in some ways, Romney made that choice, too. He could’ve gone and run the [Julian Robertson’s] Tiger funds, and instead he went and worked really hard to try and become president.


Northwest Thinker: Tiimothy Egan

http://www.timothyegan.com/

November 29, 2012, 9:00 pm

A Liberal Moment

Still hard to believe, I told a friend the other day while trying to fathom the election results, that pot is legal in my state, gays are free to marry, and a black man who vowed to raise taxes on the rich won a majority of the popular vote for president, back to back - the first time any Democrat has done that since Franklin Roosevelt's second election in 1936.
And yet only one in four voters identified themselves as "liberal" in national exit polls. Conservatives were 35 percent, and moderates the plurality, at 41 percent. The number of voters who agreed to the "l" tag was up by three percentage points, for what it's worth, from 22 percent in 2008.
What's going on here, demography and democracy seem to be saying at the same time, is the advance of progressive political ideas by a majority that spurns an obvious label. Liberals have long been a distinct minority; liberalism, in its better forms, has been triumphant at key times since the founding of the Republic.

Abraham Lincoln's push for the 13th Amendment, erasing the original sin of slavery from the land, was a liberal moment, as dramatized in Steven Spielberg's new film. Teddy Roosevelt's embrace of the income tax, eventually written into the Constitution after he left office, was a liberal moment. "No single device has done so much to secure the future of capitalism as this tax," said John Kenneth Galbraith.
Women's suffrage in 1920, Social Security in 1935, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - all liberal moments. Ditto the creation of national parks, and laws against child labor and poisoning the environment, and for giving most Americans access to health care.
Democrats were the knuckle-draggers on race and populist economic reform in the 19th century, Republicans in the latter half of the 20th. The party identities change; the arc of enlightenment does not.
Which brings us to the fascinating self-portrait of the United States at the start of the second half of the Obama era. A tenuous center-left majority wants to restore some equality to the outsize imbalance between the very rich and the rest of us. If a tenuous president can lead that coalition, without overreaching, he might be remembered among the greats.
In its simplest form, this will involve raising taxes at the high end and reforming entitlements enough to ensure their continued success and sustainability. Much of that, an accountant could do. But it takes a gifted politician for the heavier lifting. That leader will have to make his still-fledgling health care act work and earn his premature Nobel Peace Prize on an issue like climate change. In the process, he could restore the good name to traditional liberalism.
For at least a generation's time, liberals in this country have been afraid to call themselves liberal. Was it the excesses of their creed, from race-based preferential programs that went on far too long to crude speech censorship by the politically correct and humorless (one and the same) that soiled the brand? In blindly embracing, say, the teachers' union in the face of overwhelming evidence that public education needs a jolt or in never questioning the efficacy of government programs, the left earned its years in exile.
Or was it the relentless campaign by the broadcasting and publishing empires of the far right, associating liberals with tyranny, spiritual vacuity and baby killing, that drove people from the label that could not speak its name? "Godless," "Treason" and "Demonic" are actual Ann Coulter book titles, and a representative sample of the profitable cartooning of liberals.
Liberalism, in the broadest sense, is about expanding human rights and opportunity, while embracing science and reason. What do they call the secularists in Egypt today pushing for democracy over a theocracy? Liberals.
The Progressives of the early 20th had an amazing run - direct elections of senators, regulation of monopolistic trusts, modernization of public schools, cleaning up the food supply - with only one major blooper: Prohibition.
The New Deal's lasting legacy, Social Security, and its counterpart of the 1960s, Medicare, allowed millions of American to live out their lives in dignity. Those programs, attacked as socialistic abominations by the Fox News shills of their day, are now considered near sacrosanct by Americans of all political stripes.
Conservatives of the last decade lost their way by rejecting science, immigration reform and personal freedom, particularly in regard to choices made by women and gays. If you believe in climate change, finding a path to citizenship for millions of hard-working Hispanics and the right to marry the person you love, there is no place in the Republican Party of 2012 for you.
Their neo-con wing started a pair of disastrous wars that all but bankrupted the country. And for leaders, at least on television, the party put forth crackpots like Rick Santorum, Sarah Palin, Michele Bachmann and the morally elastic Newt Gingrich. This chorus promoted an orthodoxy that forced this year's standard-bearer, Mitt Romney, to sound even more out of touch than he already was.
All political moments are ephemeral. This one could vanish in the blink of a donkey's eye. But here it is: a chance to shore up a battered middle class, make the promise of health care expansion work and do something about a planet in peril. Huge tasks, of course, and fraught with risk. For now, the majority of Americans have Obama's back. But should he fail, the same majority could become something much worse - a confederacy of cynics.
In an earlier version of this article, the word "Democrat" was inadvertently omitted from the first sentence. This has been corrected.

Friday, November 23, 2012

Unmaking the Public University: The Fourty Year Assault on the Middle Class

"Silicon-age California promised..an end to alleged inefficiencies of that broadly based and increasingly multiracial middle class...for the black and brown youth who were said to be unworthy of UC Berkeley [because of Reagan era "color- blind racism"], the largest, most expensive prison building boom in history. Between 1984 and 2004...prison expenditures grew 126 percent. The bill was paid in effect from funds for universities, which declined by 12 percent in constant dollars during that period." 91

 ..capital formation has always depended in large part on rent as a mechanism for increasing the rate of profit over the rate that would obtain in a truly competitive markets." [eg. Microsoft's vs. Netscape] 132

..leading companies stayed ahead by limiting the choices of customers to whom they could then charge rents. Business was looking to knowledge management to turn a worker's ideas into a proprietary product that would return a rent sized profit. 132

The new knowledge economy sought not just "knowledge" but "proprietary knowledge" that produced big, rent profits. The new "knowledge management system" sought to differentiate the rare proprietary knowledge worker from the rest who were "interchangeable with someone less costly and troublesome...134

For the Knowledge Management system "Uniqueness did not mean unique genius or originality. uniqueness was not an intellectual quality at all.  It was a property category: uniqueness meant sole ownership"..."proprietary knowledge". 132-133  See Thomas A. Stewart "Intellectual Capital" (1997).

"...in the KM system the vast armies of college graduates would not be funneled to the winning quadrant but would be dispersed through all four [three] quadrants [commodity skills (interchangeable); leveraged skills; proprietary skills--most (college educated) people are merely "cost" and interchangeable], and therefore be fungible, disposable, outsourced and vulnerable as a group...Humanities research was already seen as economically trivial. Humanities graduates were, to the contrary, a centerpiece of the system of corporate workforce preparation that rested on the college degree. Humanities majors were the generic college graduate. They were employable not because they could use and extend the great traditions of art and letters but because they had two other qualities": "communication skills" and "cross-cultural managers"--skills associated with a network economy and majoritarian capitalism, but "In tandem with other culture-war attacks on these qualities, knowledge management dismissed their economic value. Nontechnical college graduates, KM declared, simply did not offer the company proprietary knowledge...Business was still enormously large and expensive, but it was now focused on liquidating or cheapening the personnel not tied to its proprietary products." [in the form of interchangeability outsourcing] 134-5

"Knowledge management linked big returns to protected technoknowledge and linked culture to background support systems. It admitted the necessity of culture but cheerfully defined it as a handmaiden to economics." 135

The key to KM was to transform "human capital" into "structural capital" or capital owned by the firm or  business... a "repackaging of a Marxist truth about capitalism: capitalism operates by converting the labor of workers into the capital of the firm." 136-7.

"The purpose of KM was to prevent humane management from eroding the boundary between highly competent employees and financial decisions." 138

"Finance worked in parallel with the culture wars, undermining the corporate cultural movements that had emerged from the crisis of the 1970's. KM did not reconnect finance to the labor process, but maintained its separate superiority in a superficial humanistic way." 138

The ironic logic of these cascading cutbacks ["market determinism"] was correct but incomplete. It was inevitable only when the "many factors" mentioned at the start are excluded--the culture wars tarnishing of the humanities fields, the failure of these fields to redefine and articulate their public utility, and their market fatalism in itself. The MLA [Modern Language Association] analysis simply argued that under existing market conditions there was an oversupply of humanistic publication [and PhD.s] 149

"In an attempt to be realistic about economic forces, LCS [Language and Culture Studies] learned one half of the lesson of business.  It was the half the culture wars taught again and again: the market was to be adapted to, not to be criticized or changed. The market model blocked rather than answered the simple question: who or what decides the level of demand? The other half of the lesson of business, the half LCS ignored, was the requirement to respond to "market" environments by increasing one's own influence over the market's demand decisions. This meant learning how to manage markets--how to discover hidden demands, how to create demand for products one thinks are important, how to adapt the market to one's output, how to subordinate markets to the needs of one's "customers", not to mention the wider society." 149-150

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Supply Side Economics: "cranks and charlatans"

http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2007/07/on-charlatons-and-cranks.html


http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/11/08/1167281/schumer-boehner-rumpelstiltskin/

used the phrase "charlatans and cranks" in the first edition of my principles textbook to describe some of the economic advisers to Ronald Reagan, who told him that broad-based income tax cuts would have such large supply-side effects that the tax cuts would raise tax revenue. I did not find such a claim credible, based on the available evidence. I never have, and I still don't.

Middle-Out Economics: New Paradigm

http://www.democracyjournal.org/20/growth-and-the-middle-class.php?page=1

Sunday, November 11, 2012

The Mind and the Market: Jerry Muller

http://www.amazon.com/The-Mind-Market-Capitalism-Western/dp/0385721668/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top


"What he opposed was government measures taht distorted the information system of the market by actually setting wages, rents, or the price of commodities to conform to sme social ideal or political expedient" 370-371

He [Hayek] approved of some of the goals of the welfare state, and regarded some of them as practicable. He acknowledged that "there are common needs that can be satisfied only by collective action," and asserted that as society grows richer, "that minimum of sustenance which the community has always provided for those not able to look after themselves, and which can be provided outside the market, will gradually rise, and that government may, usefully and without doing any harm, assist or enve lead in such endeavors.  There is little reason why the government should not always play some role, or even take the initiative, in such areas as social insurance and education," (The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, 1960) p.257-258, Road...p. 120-1, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol 3, The Political Order of a Free People, Chicago 1979] p.370 The Mind and the Market."






Hegel was of the same generation as the founders of German Romanticism. The shared lament of German Romantic poetry, polemic, theology, and politics was that the modern secular world left the individual alienated...On the one hand, they stressed the creative power and particularity of the individual, on the other, the need for the individual to connect with some higher force through intuition or a leap of the imagination.  That higher force could be nature, the nation, the Volk, the Catholic Church, or God. But the link between the individual and the larger "whole" was, for the Romantics, ans essentially nonrational one, a surrender of the rational self to a higher force, which endowed life with meaning. p. 151.

..For Hegel, that whole (or "totality') included the relationship of the individual to God and to history. 151 [Burke believe this force lie under "the veil" of tradition and could not be grasped by reason or philosophy--the "the Fairy Land of Philosophy" p.114

"..unlike the Romantics, Hegel claimed that the relationship to the individual to the larger institutions of which he was a part could be grasped by reason and must be objectively communicable." 151

"...He insisted that the individual got a sense of himself as part of something larger not through an irrational surrender to some other worldly source, but through a series of institutional links--what Hegel called "mediations"--between the individual and the wider world.  His task as a philosopher was to explain those links; how they had come about, and how they functioned to give the individual a sense o himself both as an autonomous subject and as a part of a larger project that he could rationally affirm." 151

Hegel's philosophical project is to reconcile men to the world, a world in which modern men pride themselves on their individual subjectivity and particularity.  Hegel knew that to most people "freedom" meant the possibility of doing what one liked, without institutional restrictions.  Limitations on our activity, in this conception, are barriers to freedom.  Freedom is understood as negative freedom. Taken seriously, Hegel says, it becomes destructive of every institutional order, since it views every institution as an intolerable limitation." 152

"Hegel mentions the disinclination of individuals to pay taxes to the state as evidence of this lack of recognition of the realities that make civil society possible." 155

"There is an elective affinity...between fundamentalism in religion and in economics.  [neo-classical, free market] Liberals took their economic dogmas and applied them mechanically.  They worshipped free trade as a fetish, as an end in itself, rather than asking how it was linked to personal happiness and national welfare..Their belief in the beneficent effects of free trade and the growth of business made any form of government planing and intervention seem heretical." on Matthew Arnold
HeHeHHeHe

Sunday, November 4, 2012

Ha-Jung Chang: Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism

http://www.amazon.com/Things-They-Dont-About-Capitalism/dp/1608193381/ref=la_B001HOFPKS_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1352046617&sr=1-1

I like this idea: Become "active economic citizens": learn the basic principles of how capitalist economies work and force your representatives in government to present their policy decisions with reason and science. Principle 1: There are no "free markets": Government is ALWAYS involved.


  • In 1819 "free market" advocates howled that the British Parliament would attempt to regulate the "freedom of contract" between children and cotton factory owners. The legislation ATTEMPTED to ban the employment of children under 9 years of age and restrict the work hours of children between the ages of ten and sixteen to twelve hours a day. The legislation did not pass..."If some markets LOOK free, it is only because we so totally accept the regulations that are propping them up that they become invisible." p.2
  •  "I personally think that society is responsible for a very significant percentage of what I've earned. If you stick me down in the middle of Bangladesh or Peru or someplace, you'll find out how much this talent is going go produce in the wrong kind of soil. I will be struggling 30 years later. I work in a market system that happens to reward what I do very well--disproportionately well". Warren Buffet p. 30

Sunday, October 7, 2012

White House Burning..Our National Debt

169 "...tax systems should be simple. A more complicated system not only increases administration and compliance costs but also creates opportunities for legal or illegal tax evasion: For example, Google funnels its revenues from European operations through a subsidiary in Ireland, a subsidiary in the Netherlands, and another Irish subsidiary located in Bermuda in order to legally avoid billions of dollars in taxes--not only lowering government tax revenues but also diverting large amounts of money to lawyers and accountants whose main business is tax shelters."http://www.amazon.com/White-House-Burning-Founding-National/dp/0307906965

"...the corporate tax amounted to 4.8% of GDP in the 1950's and 3.8% in the 1960's, it fell to 1.9% by the first decade of the 2000's and only 1.3% in 2010.  Including state taxes, corporate taxes in the U.S. are among the lowest as a share of GDP in the industrialized world." (even though businesses and their lobbyists complain that the 35%  RATE is the (second) highest in the world, loopholes make it one of the lowest real taxe rates in the world). 121

Since wage income has a cap of 106k for social security taxation,  someone who makes only 50k will pay 15.3% of his/her income; while someone who makes 200k pays 19k or a rate of only 9.5%.  ...a regressive tax rate rather than a progressive tax rate. 120

 Regressive taxation now accounts for 6% of GDP while in 1950's only 2%.  Hense "..an increasing share of government revenues have come from regressive rather than progressive taxes, shifting the overall tax burden onto lower-income people."

If we raised the cap to 250k, Social Security would be viable for 75 more years.  Easy fix--unless you're wealthy. 120

Given that modern societies depend upon markets to "produce outcomes that are beneficial for everyone...much of modern economics is devoted to identifying and explaining the many situations where pure free market systems fail to produce socially beneficial outcomes.  The limits of the free market are one of the major conceptual reasons we need governments." 167

http://www.politicususa.com/bernie-sanders-exposes-18-ceos-trillions-bailouts-evaded-taxes-outsourced-jobs.html

"In a low tax/low benefit world, you bank account is a little bigger (if you make enough money to pay taxes), but you face more risk of running out of money in retirement or not being able to afford health care; in a high-tax/high benefit world, your bank account is a little smaller but you face less risk.  Since rich people are better able to self-insure, they gain less by pooling their risk with other people, and so they might be better off in a low-tax/low benefit world; poor people cannot self-insure, so they gain the most from risk pooling, and they will be better off in a high-tax/high benefit world. 134

"Compared to current policy, reducing benefits so we can keep our low tax rates is a form of redistribution from the poor to the rich; raising taxes so we can maintain todays benefit levels is a form of redistributing from the rich to the poor (assuming tax increases are progressive)." Either way will work. What we decide is a political decision not an economic one, and it depends on what kind of government we want. 134











Friday, October 5, 2012

Economic Freedom vs. Government Spending


http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_spending#Per_capita


Per capita

Comparison of National Spending Per Citizen for the 20 Largest Economies.
In 2010, the Federal government of the USA spent an average of $11,041 per citizen (per capita). This compares to the 2010 World average spending of $2376 per citizen and an average of $16,110 per citizen for the World's 20 largest economies (in terms of GDP). Of the 20 largest economies, only six spent less per citizen: South Korea ($4557), Brazil ($2813),Russia ($2458), China ($1010), and India ($226). Of the 13 that spent more, Norway andSweden top the list with per citizen spending of $40908 and $26760 respectively.[8]



Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Book idea: mythologie of collaborative creation


Collaborative creation: compare Montheism with polytheism: we need a new myth



The New York Times


September 21, 2012

The Internet? We Built That

Who created the Internet and why should we care? These questions, so often raised during the Bush-Gore election in 2000, have found their way back into the political debate this season — starting with one of the most cited texts of the preconvention campaign, Obama’s so-called “you didn’t build that” speech. “The Internet didn’t get invented on its own,” Obama argued, in the lines that followed his supposed gaffe. “Government research created the Internet so that all the companies could make money off the Internet.” In other words: business uses the Internet, but government made it happen.
About a week after Obama’s speech, The Wall Street Journal’s Gordon Crovitz took on those lines from Obama’s speech, claiming it was an “urban legend” that the government built the Internet. Credit for the early networking innovations, Crovitz argued, belonged to private-sector companies like Xerox and Apple. It was no accident, he observed, that the Net languished in relative obscurity for two decades until private corporations and venture capitalists turned their focus to it.
So what had once seemed to be a relatively stable narrative grounding has in recent months erupted with all sorts of political tremors. For most of the past two decades, the story of the Internet’s origins followed a fairly standardized plot: the Internet was originally developed by computer scientists whose research was heavily financed by the federal government, most notably through Darpa, the research arm of the Defense Department. Some narratives emphasized the decentralized network architecture designed by Paul Baran to survive a nuclear strike; others gave credit to the British programmer Tim Berners-Lee, whose World Wide Web gave the Internet a more accessible hypertextual layer. And of course there were all those Al Gore jokes.
The renewed political stakes in the details of this origin story are obvious. If you believe Big Government built the most important communications platform of our time, then that success is a powerful riposte to all the standard claims about bureaucratic inefficiencies and incompetence. Government might be able to out-innovate the private sector, given the right focus and commitment (and freedom from being beholden to stockholders). But if you believe that the Internet’s success is largely attributable to the private sector, all the usual libertarian homilies remain untarnished.
So was the Internet created by Big Government or Big Capital? The answer is: Neither. This is what’s most notable about the debate over the Net’s origins: it misses the most interesting part of the story. We live in a world that assumes that the most important and original products in society — bridges, cars, iPads, hospitals, 787s, houses — are created either by states or by corporations. And yet, against all odds, the Internet came from somewhere else entirely.
Like many of the bedrock technologies that have come to define the digital age, the Internet was created by — and continues to be shaped by — decentralized groups of scientists and programmers and hobbyists (and more than a few entrepreneurs) freely sharing the fruits of their intellectual labor with the entire world. Yes, government financing supported much of the early research, and private corporations enhanced and commercialized the platforms. But the institutions responsible for the technology itself were neither governments nor private start-ups. They were much closer to the loose, collaborative organizations of academic research. They were networks of peers.
Peer networks break from the conventions of states and corporations in several crucial respects. They lack the traditional economic incentives of the private sector: almost all of the key technology standards are not owned by any one individual or organization, and a vast majority of contributors to open-source projects do not receive direct compensation for their work. (The Harvard legal scholar Yochai Benkler has called this phenomenon “commons-based peer production.”) And yet because peer networks are decentralized, they don’t suffer from the sclerosis of government bureaucracies. Peer networks are great innovators, not because they’re driven by the promise of commercial reward but rather because their open architecture allows others to build more easily on top of existing ideas, just as Berners-Lee built the Web on top of the Internet, and a host of subsequent contributors improved on Berners-Lee’s vision of the Web.
Now imagine, for the sake of argument, that some Dr. Evil invented a kind of targeted magnetic-pulse device that could home in on peer-produced software; one push of the button, and every single line of code that had been created through open-source collaborative networks would instantly vanish. What would happen if that button were pushed?
For starters, the Internet and the Web would instantly evaporate. Every Android smartphone, every iPad, iPhone and Mac would go dark. A massive section of our energy infrastructure would cease to function. The global stock markets would go offline for weeks, if not longer. Planes would drop out of the sky. It would be an event on the scale of a world war or a pandemic.
In other words, it’s impossible to overstate the importance of peer production to the modern digital world. Peer networks created and maintain the Linux operating system on which Android smartphones are based; the UNIX kernel that Mac OS X and iOS devices use; and the Apache software that powers most Web servers in the world (not to mention the millions of entries that now populate Wikipedia). What sounds on the face of it like the most utopian of collectivist fantasies — millions of people sharing their ideas with no ownership claims — turns out to have made possible the communications infrastructure of our age.
It’s not enough to say that peer networks are an interesting alternative to states and markets. The state and the market are now fundamentally dependent on peer networks in ways that would have been unthinkable just 20 years ago.
Why is this distinction worth making? Why should we avoid the easy explanations of a government-built Internet versus one animated by private-sector entrepreneurs?
One reason is that there is a growing number of individuals and organizations who believe the digital success of peer networks can be translated into the “real” world. Peer networks laid the foundation for the scientific revolution during the Enlightenment, via the formal and informal societies and coffeehouse gatherings where new research was shared. The digital revolution has made it clear that peer networks can work wonders in the modern age. New organizations are using peer-network approaches to attack low-tech problems. Consider the way Kickstarter has used networks of smaller funders to help solve the problem of supporting creative projects. Only three years old, Kickstarter is now on track to distribute more money this year than the National Endowment for the Arts.
But there is another, more subtle reason to stress the peer-network version of the Internet’s origins. We have an endless supply of folklore about heroic entrepreneurs who changed the world with their vision and their force of will. But as a society we lack master narratives of creative collaboration.
When we talk about change being driven by mass collaboration, it’s often in the form of protest movements: civil rights or marriage equality. That’s a tradition worth celebrating, but it’s only part of the story. The Internet (and all the other achievements of peer networks) is not a story about changing people’s attitudes or widening the range of human tolerance. It’s a story, instead, about a different kind of organization, neither state nor market, that actually builds things, creating new tools that in turn enhance the way states and markets work.
In the lines that followed his “you didn’t build that” comment, Obama managed to champion a collaborative ethos in much more eloquent terms: “The point is, is that when we succeed, we succeed because of our individual initiative, but also because we do things together. There are some things, just like fighting fires, we don’t do on our own. I mean, imagine if everybody had their own fire service. That would be a hard way to organize fighting fires. So we say to ourselves, ever since the founding of this country: you know what, there are some things we do better together.”
Obama is right, of course; life is full of things we do better together. But what the Internet and its descendants teach us is that there are now new models for doing things together, success stories that prove convincingly that you don’t need bureaucracies to facilitate public collaboration, and you don’t need the private sector to innovate.
That should be the story we tell our kids when they ask who invented the Internet. Yes, we should tell them about the long-view government spending that paid the initial salaries, and the entrepreneurs who figured out a way to make the new medium commercially viable. But we shouldn’t bury the lead. The Internet was built, first and foremost, by another network, this one made up not of servers but of human minds: open, decentralized, peer.
Steven Johnson is the author of “Future Perfect: The Case for Progress in a Networked Age,” published this month.

MORE IN MAGAZINE (18 OF 27 ARTICLES)

Talk: The Pop Diplomacy of Quincy Jones