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"More than half of the weekly churchgoers, have constituted the most about in Regnerus's sample, were no longer virgins by the age of 18, and well over 90% of all evangelical adults engage in sex before they marry; even those who delay sexual activity into their 20s nonetheless are likely to engage in premarital sex.
This combination of sex and conservatism breeds (in addition to general tensions) a set of reinforcing cycles. More sex prompts more sermons and more sizzle on abstinence. More religion may, in fact delay the beginning of sexual activity, particularly for the devout who constitute 20 to 25% of evangelicals Regnerus studied. It also, however, makes it more likely that teens who engage in sex will fail to use contraception, which in turn increases the likelihood of pregnancy. More pregnancy fuels parent shall concern and–as we will see in the next chapter–more forced marriages that raise the risk of divorce. Early marriage and childbearing, in addition to increasing instability, derails education and limits earning potential. More limited- men's income compels women's greater workforce participation and, especially when it occurs because of the husband limitations as a breadwinner, decreases family happiness, particularly among the most traditional families. The consequential sense of failure increases the demands to constrain the popular culture–and blue family practices such as contraception and abortion–that undermines parental efforts to instill the right moral values in children."
The values of the blue paradigm therefore threatened adherence of the red paradigm at the same time the blue script of financial independence before marriage leaves out younger and poorer families. These families have always required greater support. In today's world, however, were formal education is becoming crucially important to economic success and were increased mobility both multiplies opportunities and undermines family and community networks, that support is harder to come by.
CONCLUSION:
The economic changes of the late 20th and early 21st centuries reinforce the dominance of the blue family model in the wealthier and more urban areas of the country. Young adults who are able to realize the benefits of increased education and delay childbearing attain greater socioeconomic and geographic mobility. college graduates are more than twice as likely as those who did not finish college to move across state lines, and when they move, they choose communities with more opportunities and more compatible forms of cultural expression. As like chooses like, wealthier areas of the country become richer, and the dominance of the middle class model increases within those regions, increasing internal support for controlled childbearing, 2 career families, and egalitarian gender roles. The rest of the country, and particularly the more rural, or traditional, and slower growing communities, would like to reaffirm traditional values. The reaffirmation of traditional values, however, has become more difficult as economic conditions reserve greater rewards for the well-educated and undermined the traditional division of labor on which family stability previously arrested. Moreover, the reaffirmation may prove to be counterproductive for the community as a whole if restricted access to contraception and abortion increases teen births, early marriages produce more divorces, and a changing family structure undermines educational and employment prospects of parents and children.
These changes, which correspond to increasing economic inequality in the United States as the blue areas of the country has disproportionately benefited from the information economy, have understandably increased the sense of moral alarm in red states. the question of what can and should be done to address these issues, however, depends on both the diagnosis of the problem—moral decay or too early family formation?—and the ability to garner the political will to address the underlying issues.…"
For red families, the central irony is that the moralistic basis of family attitudes requires and generates even stronger pressures for reinforcement. In here and see themselves as an embattled landlord whose hold on their own children is endangered. In the year of the pill, red efforts to restrain sexuality did considerably more effort than blue efforts to restrain reproduction. Moreover, most effective means of doing so—community diligence and read horsemen of the norms of chastity and family stability—have become much harder to produce in a society that disagrees in profound ways on family values.
The values of the blue paradigm therefore threatened adherence of the red paradigm at the same time the blue script of financial independence before marriage leaves out younger and poorer families. These families have always required greater support. In today's world, however, were formal education is becoming crucially important to economic success and were increased mobility both multiplies opportunities and undermines family and community networks, that support is harder to come by.
CONCLUSION:
The economic changes of the late 20th and early 21st centuries reinforce the dominance of the blue family model in the wealthier and more urban areas of the country. Young adults who are able to realize the benefits of increased education and delay childbearing attain greater socioeconomic and geographic mobility. college graduates are more than twice as likely as those who did not finish college to move across state lines, and when they move, they choose communities with more opportunities and more compatible forms of cultural expression. As like chooses like, wealthier areas of the country become richer, and the dominance of the middle class model increases within those regions, increasing internal support for controlled childbearing, 2 career families, and egalitarian gender roles. The rest of the country, and particularly the more rural, or traditional, and slower growing communities, would like to reaffirm traditional values. The reaffirmation of traditional values, however, has become more difficult as economic conditions reserve greater rewards for the well-educated and undermined the traditional division of labor on which family stability previously arrested. Moreover, the reaffirmation may prove to be counterproductive for the community as a whole if restricted access to contraception and abortion increases teen births, early marriages produce more divorces, and a changing family structure undermines educational and employment prospects of parents and children.
These changes, which correspond to increasing economic inequality in the United States as the blue areas of the country has disproportionately benefited from the information economy, have understandably increased the sense of moral alarm in red states. the question of what can and should be done to address these issues, however, depends on both the diagnosis of the problem—moral decay or too early family formation?—and the ability to garner the political will to address the underlying issues.…"
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